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A commentary on
Flipping a coin in your headwithoutmon-
itoring outcomes? Comments on predict-
ing free choices and a demo program
by Lages, M., Boyle, S. C., and Jaworska,
K. (2013). Front. Psychol. 4:925. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00925
In a series of three human neuroimaging
studies we recently identified prefrontal
and parietal brain signals that predict a
person’s upcoming “free” choice up to sev-
eral seconds before a person believes to
be making up their mind (Soon et al.,
2008, 2013; Bode et al., 2011). These
findings were based on a combination
of functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) with multivariate pattern clas-
sification (e.g., Haynes and Rees, 2006)
and extended similar previous work using
electroencephalography measures where
choice-predictive signals were also found,
albeit across shorter time scales (e.g., Libet
et al., 1983; Haggard and Eimer, 1999).
We took care to perform a number of
sanity checks in order to rule out potential
alternative explanations for our data (Soon
et al., 2008), and more research will be
needed to establish the nature and poten-
tial function of choice-predictive signals
(Haynes, 2011). One of the questions we
already originally addressed was whether
our choice-predictive signals might reflect
a spill-over from the previous trial, rather
than being related to a process involved
in shaping the upcoming choice. There
were several aspects of our data that spoke
against such an account. First, the classi-
fication accuracy increased with distance
from the previous trial. Second, the classi-
fication of the time period of the next trial
was not above chance, meaning that the
regions we identified presumably did not
carry predictive signals into the next trial.
Third, we also used a simple assessment
of randomness to check for dependencies
between successive trials. We found that in
our data sequence length roughly followed
the shape of an exponential distribution, as
would be expected for random data.
Lages et al. (2013) now raise the ques-
tion whether this latter analysis, our assess-
ment of randomness might not have been
sufficient. We fully agree that the orig-
inal approach was only an approximate
assessment of randomness that can be
improved in many ways. However, it was
only one among a number of points that
spoke against sequential dependencies.
The proper assessment of randomness in
the data from our choice experiments
is tricky because the experimental data
were acquired in separate runs, each of
which only contained only around 10
choices. We recently published a reanal-
ysis of the behavioral data from these
studies (Allefeld et al., 2013) using more
sensitive analyses based on single-subject
data. A stochastic process analysis revealed
that subjects’ data was close to random
with an entropy rate of around 0.95
bit/trial (where 1 bit/trial reflects per-
fectly random behavior). The redictability
of a choice on trial N from the choice
in the previous trial N − 1 was approx-
imately 62–64%, based on a classifier
that also exploited small base-rate differ-
ences between choices. This is in a simi-
lar range as between-trial predictability in
other studies (e.g., Lopes, 1982), including
those found by these authors (Lages and
Jaworska, 2012).
Because the brain-based classification
accuracies were on a similar scale to
the trial-by-trial behavioral predictions
one might be led to believe that the
brain-based prediction reflects nothing
other than the carry-over of information
between trials (Lages et al., 2013). In the
following we will explain why this infer-
ence is misguided and present data to show
that our classification does not directly
reflect signals from the previous trial.
The “spillover model” postulates that the
choice on the previous trial (CN − 1) has
some form of temporal persistence in the
brain that leads it to spill over into the next
trial (CN), creating the false impression of
a choice-predictive signal in trial N several
seconds before the choice (Figure 1A). In
this model the classifier simply picks up
the spillover signal and is only predictive of
the next trial because of the weak behav-
ioral correlation. Please note, however,
that because the predictive link between
CN−1 and CN is weak (albeit existent),
the brain-based classifier would need to be
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FIGURE 1 | Choice-predictive brain signals and previous trials. (A) The
spillover model assumes that the predictive classification of choice CN at
time Tpredict is based on some form of residual information lingering from
the previous choice CN −1 (red). The original model assumes that the
predictive classification reflects the emergence of choice-related processes
(green) that does not directly reflect an explicit representation of the
previous trial, even though it presumably evolves in some way from the
previous trial based on the causal dynamics of the brain. In the spillover
model the prediction of CN is based alone on signals related to CN −1 and is
due to the fact that the two choices CN − 1 and CN are correlated. Please
note that if this were the case then the signal recorded at Tpredict should
contain substantially more information about CN −1 than about CN . So if the
spillover model is true, it should be possible to decode the previous trial
CN −1 considerably better than the current trial CN . In contrast, if the original
model is true, then a shift in labels by trial would largely abolish all predictive
signals. (B) Reanalysis of choice-predictive brain signals with labels shifted
by one trial. For this reanalysis of the original data (left: Soon et al., 2008;
right: Soon et al., 2013) we shifted the trial labels by one trial, thus
investigating whether a shifted model reflecting a spillover from the previous
trial provided a better account for our brain signals. The figures here show
data for the shifted analysis in red and for the original analysis in black. The
data are collapsed across the three significant clusters lateral prefrontal
cortex (lPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and precuneus (PC) for Soon
et al. (2008) and collapsed across the two significant clusters medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and precuneus (PC) for Soon et al. (2013). Please
note that the choice-predictive signals for the original analysis were
significant for each region of interest (ROI) individually. For the label-shifted
reanalysis they were not-significant at any ROI, thus suggesting that the
shifted model does not provide a good account for our data. The collapsing
across ROIs in this figure was done in order to increase the statistical power
for additionally testing for a difference between the original and the shifted
analysis. This was necessary due to the fact that the original analysis was
tested against a fixed (i.e., “noise-free”) parameter, whereas the statistical
power for testing for a difference between the original and shifted analyses
is affected by the noise in the shifted classification. Please also note that the
baseline accuracies apparent here (and in the original studies) show that the
default accuracy is 50%, as expected for two alternative choices. For this
reason we did not perform additional permutation tests. (∗p < 0.05).
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able to decode the brain signal related to
CN − 1 with incredible precision in order
to then be sufficiently predictable for CN ,
because the two are only weakly correlated.
The key issue here is that the sole num-
bers of the trial-by-trial contingencies and
the brain-based decoding accuracies alone
do not allow us to tell whether the spillover
model is true. The only way to decide this
issue is to directly test whether the spillover
model provides a better account of our
data. This can be done by applying the
same classification analysis as in the orig-
inal study, but shifted by one trial, i.e., to
determine whether neural activity predict-
ing the current trial still encodes the previ-
ous decision. If the spillover model is true,
the classification accuracy should increase
when shifting the labels by one trial. We
performed this analysis (see Figure 1B) for
both original studies. We found no decod-
able choice information using the shifted
model. In contrast the information from
our original model was significant in the
seconds leading up to the decision and it
was significantly higher than that of the
shifted model. Thus, our original model
provides the better account of the data and
suggests that the choice-predictive signals
are not based on a spill-over between trials.
Finally, we would like to point out that
we obviously believe that there has to be
some form of relationship between the
brain signals of the two neighboring tri-
als. It would be untenable to assume that
choices come out of the blue by some
break in the causal flow of events in the
brain, rather than by a causal dynami-
cal process that links the previous trial to
the current trial. The issue is whether the
choice-predictive signals we find are some
emergent property of the brain dynamics
in the inter-trial period, or whether they
reflect a direct and explicit representation
of the previous trial, for which we find no
evidence in our data.
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